Gesellschaftsrechtliche Aspekte der Datentreuhand

Lukas Tuschhoff examines the design of data trustees at the intersection of data economy law and corporate law. Data trustees are regarded as an institutional response to trust deficits, power asymmetries, and coordination problems in data-driven markets. They are intended to address inefficiencies such as data silos, principal-agent conflicts, network effects, and concentrated market structures. EU data economy law, in particular the Data Governance Act, sets out requirements for data intermediation services but does not prescribe their organizational structure, leaving this to national corporate law. The study starts from the premise that data-related power and conflicts of interest require institutional structures. Data trusteeship is therefore understood as a matter of organizational law. The analysis focuses on how data power can be translated into corporate governance, control, and accountability structures. In addition to the choice of legal form, the design of articles of association and contracts, as well as group law aspects, are central. The author develops a typology of data trustee models-such as intra-company, data altruistic, and arrangements between companies or between companies and consumers-and assigns them differentiated corporate law solutions. Particular attention is given to foundation-based limited liability companies, dual-foundation models, and corporate group structures. The study thus opens up a previously underexplored interface between European data economy law and national corporate law.